As contradictory claims fly over who possesses central Anlong Veng, analysts agree that for the first time since hard-liners took the remote area in 1990 it doesn’t matter much who controls it.
“Anlong Veng is not so important,” one Southeast Asian diplomat said Wednesday of the Khmer Rouge military command post for the last eight years.
“There are plenty of other bases in the north of Cambodia and [hard-liners] can start to work from there. They can even go to O’Smach and set-up themselves up there.”
Neang Phat, director of information for the Ministry of Defense, on Wednesday said gaining defectors rather than gaining territory is the primary objective of the government army.
“What is important is not the territory or the villages, but to get rid of Ta Mok and his forces,” Neang Phat said. “Gaining defectors takes us toward this goal.”
The most important aspect of the RCAF’s operation in the north, then, will be maintaining the happiness of the up to 2,000 Khmer Rouge soldiers and thousands of family members who defected in March, analysts say.
“This is the most important question,” the diplomat said of maintaining support for the almost 6,000 civilians and soldiers.
For the last three weeks, RCAF has been ferrying cold drinks, dried fish and other supplies to Preah Vihear temple, 150 km northeast of Siem Reap town, and O Bai Tap village, 60 km northeast of Siem Reap town.
But a lasting relationship may be difficult to establish because both sides have few resources to offer the other, analysts say.
“RCAF are not capable of maintaining themselves. So I do not know how they plan to [supply the defectors], unless the Pailin and Phnom Malai group plan to take them in,” the diplomat said.
In August of 1996, about 10,000 hard-line soldiers and civilians defected en masse to the government from the two western guerrilla bases of Phnom Malai and Pailin.
Khmer Rouge division commanders received top posts in the government army and the gem-producing and timber-rich areas effectively were granted autonomy.
Administration of the areas was also handled by the defectors.
An observer familiar with the post-1990 Khmer Rouge said he believes the defectors have switched sides to protect their business interests—which were largely usurped by Ta Mok when led a rebel mutiny in June 1997 against Pol Pot.
“These people know about Pailin,” said the observer. “They know how rich it is. They have it in their mind to receive from the government an autonomous status.”
But analysts draw a sharp line between the 1996 defections and the latest defection from Preah Vihear and Anlong Veng.
“Anlong Veng village is not important,” said Neang Phat. “If we compare it to Pailin, it is not so rich.
“Preah Vihear Temple is more important [than Anlong Veng]. It is a famous tourist destination.”
Pailin and Phnom Malai are self-sufficient on the lucrative trade of gems and hardwoods across Cambodia’s western border with Thailand. Defectors from Preah Vihear and Anlong Veng are displaced and have no thriving gem or timber trade to offer up to the government.
“What do these people have?” the diplomat asked. “Unfortunately for them, there are splits within their group. One is still with the hard-liners and one is with the government.
“The government has to find a way to put them in a safe haven. The fine example is Pailin and Phnom Malai.”
The RCAF is struggling to get supplies into the remote areas where the new defectors have set up camps resembling settlements of internally displaced people.
“They’re absolutely stretched to do so now,” another military analyst said.
The at least 60 kilometers to O Bai Tap village from Siem Reap town over poor roads is half a day’s journey by truck.
And the crash of the Mi-8 transport helicopter last week on top of Preah Vihear Mountain has left the RCAF with one functioning Mi-8, Seang Somnang, a high-ranking Air Force official, confirmed Tuesday.
Neang Phat said the government is planning to build houses near the Anlong Veng area for more than 18,000 defectors and provide medicine, food and clothes.
“We have a special committee to make sure these people are treated fairly and get enough,” he said.
Despite the RCAF’s ability to muster any number of transport trucks—186 military trucks and jeeps were donated by the Chinese in December—the impending wet season will cripple the army’s ability to transport soldiers and supplies.
Analysts said it is doubtful—even impossible—that the army will be able to supply the thousands of defectors when the rain begins to fall. And government territorial gains made in the past three weeks will likely be lost in the wet season.
“It will extremely effect their ability not only to supply the defectors but also [RCAF’s] forces in Anlong Veng and other areas so that they can maintain a presence there,” the military analyst said. “The [civilian defectors] will be of lesser importance.”
Counter defections could become a reality when former Khmer Rouge soldiers—some of whom have voiced their unwillingness to fight against Ta Mok’s forces—see the inability of the government to support them.
“If they don’t get the level of support that they would expect for coming over, then they’re likely to say, ‘Well what’s in it for us?’” the analyst noted. (Additional reporting by Chris Decherd)
